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Abstract
Measurement and management of credit concentration risk is critical for banks and relevant for
micro-prudential requirements. While several methods exist for measuring credit concentration
risk within institutions, the systemic effect of different institutions’ exposures to the same coun-
terparties has been less explored so far. In this paper, we propose a measure of the systemic
credit concentration risk that arises because of common exposures between different institutions
within a financial system. This approach is based on a network model that describes the effect
of overlapping portfolios. This metric is applied to synthetic and real world data to illustrate
that the effect of common exposures is not fully reflected in single portfolio concentration mea-
sures. It also allows to quantify several aspects of the interplay between interconnectedness and
credit risk. Using this network measure, we formulate an analytical approximation for the addi-
tional capital requirement corresponding to the systemic risk arising from credit concentration
interconnectedness. Our methodology also avoids double counting between the granularity ad-
justment and the common exposure adjustment. Although approximated, this common exposure
adjustment is able to capture, with only two parameters, an aspect of systemic risk that can
extend single portfolios view to a system-wide one.
1. Introduction
Concentration risk arises in a credit portfolio when there is an uneven distribution of exposures in
the portfolio. This occurs in two ways: individual borrowers (single-name concentration) or groups
of borrowers aggregated by sectors or geographical regions (sectoral concentration).
Concentrations are important because the theoretical foundations of Basel risk-based capital
requirements capital requirements assume infinite granularity of a portfolio. The are based on the
Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model, assuming an infinitely large pool of loans resulting
in a diversified credit risk portfolio [10]. This assumption enables an analytical solution for capital
requirement calculation. Because of this, additional capital is required against this risk [2].
∗The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Central Bank
of Ireland or the European Central Bank/Single Supervisory Mechanism.
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The Network Effect in Credit Concentration Risk
From a micro-prudential perspective, credit concentration has been associated with increased
risk of bank failures and increased magnitude of these failures when they occur. Credit concen-
trations are also important to macro-prudential supervisors when they have the responsibility of
identifying and mitigating sources of systemic risk across the financial system. Several banks lending
to the same counterparty is an example of system risk arising from credit concentration.
The consequences of not appropriately measuring and mitigating credit concentration risk can
be catastrophic. It has been a hallmark of several recent financial crises in Ireland and other OECD
economies. Concentrations arise at several layers of disaggregation: first, at a sector level such as
property, within that sector at a commercial property level, and then at a key number of large
developers within that sector. Lending in this sector is particularly cyclical, and therefore subject
to more abrupt declines in collateral values.
In the Irish crisis and the subsequent parliamentary inquiry that followed, one senior executive of
an Irish credit institution recounted that the top 30 exposures accounted for over 50% of the bank’s
total exposure, and 48% of its profit 1. That firm was subsequently liquidated. This problem
has occurred previously as several banks suffered large losses related to Worldcom, Enron, and
Parmalat, as well as the large commercial real estate losses experienced by US banks in the late
1980s [2].
In practice, bank credit portfolios can have concentrated exposures relating to specific obligors or
sectors depending on their business models. To capture this specific aspect of credit risk, credit con-
centration risk is specifically addressed in the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP)
as a capital surcharge, under Pillar 2. In Pillar 2 capital requirements, concentration risk charges
apply to an individual institution. However, individual institutions can have overlapping portfolios
of obligors, some of which may be important to individual banks and to the system as a whole. In
this paper, we focus on name concentration - typically a feature of Corporate /Commercial Real
Estate or other types of specialised lending.
We make three main contributions to existing research. The first one conceptualises credit risk
using a system-wide approach based on network science. We integrate two strands of the research
literature, credit risk measurement and network science, providing for a metric that measures
interdependence due to overlapping portfolios. This approach is general and could be applied to
other types of assets, sectors or geographic areas. Second, we demonstrate how this system wide
credit concentration risk measure can be practically applied, by providing an analytical estimate of
the additional prudential capital that corresponds to this type of credit risk concentration. Third,
using simulated and real-world data, we show how this additional capital formula can be calibrated
with respect to existing capital requirements and to avoid double counting with the granularity
adjustment.
2. Related work and research contribution
Various proposals exist for calculation of name or sector concentration risk to adjust the ASRF
approach. For single-name concentration, existing methods are based on some form of granularity
adjustment. These include the Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index or Gini. Depending on the implemen-
tation, these measures may not reflect changes in obligor risk [11, 9, 5].
Sector concentration risk can be calculated using multi-factor models taking into account the
systematic risk associated with that sector [18], or derive analytical approximations that require
simplifying assumptions such as intra-sector correlations remaining constant [13].
Since the 2007 crisis, various types of inter-disciplinary approaches to measuring concentration
risk have been developed. The literature merging network theory with various approaches to mea-
suring systemic risk includes work by Alter et al.[1], and Levy-Carciente et al. [14], as well as
1Large Exposures/Cross-Bank Lending section of the Irish Banking Inquiry Report, Volume 1, https://
inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/volume-1-report/chapter-1/ .
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earlier work by Huang et al.[12] and Caccioli et al.[6]. In their frameworks, similar to ours, they use
bipartite networks to describe interconnectedness through various measures. However, the primary
purpose of their analysis is to use the asset side of the bank balance sheet as part of mechanism
of cascading failures driven by links through the interbank market. This is used to investigate the
dynamics of cascading bank failures in response to an initial shock to asset value.
In our approach, we are interested in identifying the aspects of structural systemic risk with a
focus on borrowers as the source of risk, rather than the dynamics of a cascading interbank failure.
Our work focuses on distinguishing the effect of common exposures across banks, and not within
banks. While this network effect is implicitly encapsulated in the works by Huang et al.[12] and
Caccioli et al.[6], we wish to make it explicit, and develop a measure that does not require long
Monte Carlo simulations and can be used to calculate additional capital requirements specifically
related to this type of risk. The paper by Das [8] focusses on measuring systemic risk in a flexible
manner with the help of network based properties. However, he does not develop how network
metrics interact with the existing regulatory framework. Our work has also some common elements
with that by Alter et al.[1], in that we link common exposures to across the system to capital
requirements. However, our credit risk mechanism is very different to the Creditmetrics approach
used in their work.
We draw on network science, in particular the paper by Zhou et al. [19], to build a projected
network from a bipartite network and quantify the impact of lenders onto each others. The work
by Zhou et al. has been developed for a different purpose (strategies in recommendation systems),
but the logic of their model is also useful in addressing our problem.
3. Methodology
Based on the existing work and the motivating examples given in the introduction, we have several
requirements for a framework that can fully describe interconnectedness due to common expo-
sures. First, the framework should take into account not only the presence of a connection, but
its magnitude and risk. Second, it should be tractable enough to decompose individual exposure
contributions and their effect overall credit concentration risk within a given system. Third, it
should also be able to quantify the effect concentrations within one bank on other banks. Finally,
the framework should calculate the effect of changes in risky exposures through changes in the
network topology. As the focus is on credit concentration risk, we only consider a simplified subset
of a complex system involving lenders and borrowers.
We consider a set of n lenders and m borrowers, with the following simplifications:
1. We assume that lenders and borrowers are two distinct sets (e.g. we neglect interbank loans).
2. We neglect lenders liabilities structures.
These assumptions are reasonable as we want to focus on the structural nature of systemic risk,
building on within single institution credit concentration risk.
This problem can be represented as a bipartite network where one layer corresponds to the
lenders and the other to their borrowers (Fig. 1).The link between a lender and a borrower represents
the exposure of the lender to the debt of the considered borrower.
A common measure of portfolio concentration (e.g. for a bank) is the Herfindhal-Hirschman
Index (HHI):
HHI =
∑
k E
2
k
(
∑
k Ek)
2 , (1)
where the sums are calculated over the borrowers and Ek is the exposure of the considered lender
to the borrower k.
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Figure 1: Representation of a system of n = 3 lenders and m = 4 borrowers as a bipartite network.
The HHI is a simple metric that can be used to measure the credit concentration risk at the level
of each considered institution. However, pairs of lenders may be exposed to the same borrowers,
generating further concentration risk on a system wide level. In practice, the HHI does not take
into account the potential risk inherent to common exposures.
As mentioned earlier, our problem has similarities with the one investigated by Zhou et al [19].
In our case, we have a bipartite network that comprises two layers: a layer of financial institutions
(e.g. banks) and a layer of borrowers. Similarly to the network of users and products, here we
wish to quantify the similarities in the composition of financial institutions portfolios. We therefore
define a Dependency Index DI based on a modification of the quantity proposed by [19]. Our
Dependency Index is defined as the metric in [19] except for the fact that the considered bipartite
network of banks and counterparties is weighted, as in [15].
To calculate the Dependency index, we rescale exposures in a way that takes into consideration
the risk of the corresponding borrower. Let eik be the exposure of lender i to the borrower k. We
define the risk adjusted exposure wik of lender i to borrower k as
wik = f(rk)eik (2)
where f(rk) is a function of rk, the estimated risk of entity k. This function modifies the unweighted
exposure into a weighted exposure based on a risk measure for entity k. This risk measure could be
a credit rating, and internal credit scale or probability of default (PD), or a market based metric
that can rank order credit risk, such as credit spreads. As a result, wik is a n × m matrix that
connects n lenders with m borrowers.
At this stage, we project the bipartite network onto the lenders’ layer. In other words, we create
a single-layer network where a directional link from lender i to lender j represents the size of impact
of i to j, corresponding to the systemic effect of credit concentration due to common exposures.
The adjacency matrix S = (sij) of this projection is calculated as
sij =
m∑
l=1
wilwjl∑n
p=1 wpl
∑m
q=1 wjq
, (3)
where wil is the element of the adjacency matrix of the bipartite network (from lender i to borrower
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l). The sum over l in Equation (3) runs over the m borrowers. As a result, we obtain a n × n
matrix that only depends on the lenders. We name S impact matrix, as it represents the impact
that one portfolio has onto another one due to common exposures. More specifically, given two
distinct lenders i and j, the element matrix sij represents the impact that lender i has on lender j.
For example, if the two portfolios have a large overlap, sij will be higher. On the other hand, the
matrix is not necessarily symmetric, i.e. sij 6= sji, whenever the two lenders have different total
exposures. It is easy to see that the impact of a large lender on a small one will be larger than the
one of a small lender to a large one. Finally, each element on the diagonal sii represents a measure
of the amount of exposures of lender i that are not connected to other lenders.
We define Dependency Index (DIi) of bank i as a measure of the independence of a bank’s
portfolio of exposures in relation with the other banks portfolios:
DIi = 1−
 n∑
j=1
(
sji
sii
)2−1 . (4)
We can also naturally define a Dependency Index for the whole system as a weighted average over
DIi:
DIsys =
∑n
i=1
∑m
k=1 wikDIi∑n
i=1
∑m
k=1 wik
. (5)
One can immediately see that DIi values are comprised in the interval [0, 1], and it can be
directly compared with the HHI index in (1), or its risk-adjusted version
Hi =
∑
k w
2
ik
(
∑
k wik)
2 . (6)
It can be shown that the asymmetry of the matrix S is strictly related to the heterogeneity of
the total size of exposures in different institutions. In particular, we have that sij 6= sji if and only
if
m∑
q=1
wjq 6=
m∑
q=1
wiq. (7)
The two metrics, Hi and DIi should be considered as complementary, as they encapsulate two
different aspects of risk concentration, namely the concentration within the same portfolio and the
concentration due to common exposures, respectively.
In Appendix A we investigate the properties of the Dependency Index to check that it behaves
as expected in a few simple model cases.
4. Data
In this paper, we use several data sets to illustrate our approach.
4.1. Data Set 1 (DS1)
The Data Set 1 reports a sample of the real estate and corporate portfolios of two banks. The
sample covers approximatively 30% of each banks’ portfolio. Exposures are aggregated by group,
so each name corresponds to an independent counterparty. The total number of counterparties is
1100, with only 9 of them that are common to both banks. There are four levels of risk, associated
with each counterparty, that we label from 1 (the safest) to 4 (the most risky).
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4.2. Data Set 2 (DS2)
The network from Data Set 2 is created out of a set of leveraged loans. We use a set of 2204 loans
issued in USD and reported on a given day in the Markit database. The data set reports several
information, including the name of the issuer, the total amount issued, and the price on a given
day. Using these data, we create a set of overlapping portfolio using an approach that is described
in the next Section.
4.3. Data Set 3 (DS3)
The Data Set 3 reports exposures from 4 banks. The exposures are aggregated by borrower. More
specifically, the data set reports: exposures at default (EAD), probability of default (PD), loss given
default (LGD). The data set reports two snapshots of the 4 banks in two consecutive years.
5. Analysis of common exposures
5.1. Construction of the bipartite network
The first step in constructing the bipartite network of exposures is to identify the risk-adjusted
exposures.
In DS1, as we only have a discrete risk classification, we use the following method. First, we
create a homogeneous classification of counterparties’ risk by matching the assessments from each
bank. Wherever the two classifications of the same counterparty do not match, we choose the
highest (riskier) one. In order to calculate the risk weighted exposures as in (2), we consider the
weight function:
f(r) = a+ bθ(r − r0), (8)
where a = 0.2, b = 1 and r0 = 1.5. In practice, we consider two categories of risk (r = 1 on one
hand and r > 1 on the other), and give to the low risk exposure a 20% weight with respect to the
high risk exposures. This mimics typical rules of calculation of risk weighted assets [3].
In DS2, we create a set of five partially overlapping portfolios in the following way. First, we
choose the number of lenders (in this paper, we consider 5 lenders) and assume that each of them has
a portfolio exclusively from the loans in the data set. We aggregate the loans by issuer, calculating
a risk adjusted total amount. As a proxy of risk for each loan, we use the mid close price. More
precisely, we divide each amount by the coresponding price and consider that as a risk adjusted
exposure (or sum of exposures). Then, we randomly select 15% of the borrowers and assign them
exclusively to a randomly chosen lender. This fraction of “isolated borrowers” is chosen randomly,
excluding the largest 10% loans in terms of total amount issued. At this point, we assign exposures
using the other 85% of issuers. For each issuer, we divide the total amount issued into three parts,
and assign each part to three randomly selected lenders. We choose the three amount randomly,
with the only condition that each tranche must not be lower than 20% of the total amount issued.
In DS3, it is natural to use the product PD · EAD as risk-adjusted exposures.
5.2. Concentration metrics
5.2.1 DS1
The impact matrix between A and B is fairly symmetrical:
S =
(
0.983 0.019
0.017 0.981
)
. (9)
Table 1 shows the calculated properties of the two lenders. As the fraction of portfolio overlap is
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Table 1: Properties of lenders of DS1. HHI and DI are the risk-weighted Herfindhal-Hirschman Index and
Dependency Index, respectively. Co-exposures and co-weights are the unweighted and weighted
fraction of common exposures with respect to the bank’s total exposure, respectively.
Lender HHI DI Co-exposures (%) Co-weights (%)
A 0.019 0.00031 3.09 3.75
B 0.011 0.00037 3.84 4.62
only between 3 and 4%, the impact matrix shows a weakly coupled (most of the weight is on the
diagonal) and symmetric behavior. HHI and DI move in opposite directions, as expected: bank
A has a slightly more concentrated portfolio, but it is less susceptible to systemic stress, bank B
has a less concentrated portfolio, but it is marginally more susceptible to the systemic risk due to
common exposures.
We can investigate this further and project the bipartite network on the borrower side (Fig. 2
shows the network of the largest borrowers). In this projection, the weight of the links represents
the interconnectedness of two borrowers in the portfolios. This interconnectedness increases with
the size of common exposures across different lenders.
Fig. 3 displays the composition of the portfolios in terms of risk categories. We can see that
while the risk composition of portfolios A and B are fairly similar, the overlap is much more skewed
towards higher risk. In particular, we observe that the fraction of exposures in risk category 1 (the
safest) are about 9% for bank A and B, whereas it is only 3% in the overlap.
5.2.2 DS2
In DS2, we show the impact matrix of the five lenders is:
S =

0.543 0.163 0.214 0.171 0.190
0.073 0.450 0.064 0.135 0.083
0.148 0.098 0.378 0.153 0.202
0.075 0.132 0.097 0.420 0.063
0.160 0.157 0.247 0.121 0.462
 . (10)
This synthetic data set has the highest overlap of the three, as it is also shown by the concen-
tration properties in Table 2.
Table 2: Properties of lenders of DS2. HHI and DI are the risk-adjusted Herfindhal-Hirschman Index
and Dependency Index, respectively. The co-weights are the risk-adjusted fraction of common
exposures with respect to the lenders’ total exposure.
Lender HHI DI Co-weights (%)
A 0.127 0.16585 67.44
B 0.029 0.27937 92.08
C 0.101 0.45663 95.25
D 0.249 0.29145 96.25
E 0.015 0.32574 92.11
In this system, the Dependency Index is much higher than in the other two data sets. This is a
combined effect of the high overlap (as in DS3) but also the high granularity of exposures.
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Figure 2: Projected network of interdependencies among the top 20 borrowers of banks A and B in DS1.
As the two portfolios have small overlap, it is evident the clustering of the two banks portfolios.
As borrowers 4 and 8 are the only ones in the overlap, they have more interconnections across
the two groups. Borrowers that are not in the overlap tend to be more strongly connected with
the borrowers in the same portfolio.
5.2.3 DS3
The impact matrix of the four lenders is:
S =

0.875 0.147 0.056 0.307
0.079 0.776 0.067 0.269
0.003 0.007 0.863 0.006
0.043 0.070 0.014 0.419
 . (11)
As specified earlier, each off-diagonal element of the matrix sij quantifies the impact of bank i to
bank j due to the overlap among the portfolios in the system. So, for example, bank A has a smaller
impact on bank C (s13 = 0.056) than on bank D (s14 = 0.307). On the whole, we can see that the
interplay of co-exposure impacts is more complex than in DS1. The concentration properties of the
four lenders are displayed in Table 3.
In this data set, there is a sizeable overlap among portfolios, however, this does not always
translate into high inter-bank impacts, due to the different sizes of the portfolios involved. For
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Figure 3: Risk classification of overlapping risk-adjusted exposures in DS1.
example, the impact of lender A onto lender C is much higher than the impact of lender C to
lender A. Another interesting aspect is that sometimes the HHI and DI behave differently. For
example, lender D has a comparable HHI to lenders A and B, but a much higher interdependence,
whereas lender C has a small Dependency Index due to its low interconnectedness with the rest of
the system.
5.3. Portfolio overlap and risk
The metric of systemic interdependence DIsys also allows us to assess how is distributed the risk
across different portfolios. If the overlap between two portfolios were random, the risk distribution
of the overlap should be similar to the one of the two portfolios. However, Figure 3 shows that
this is not the case. Therefore, we can use the metric DIsys to quantify this difference. In order to
do that, we randomly rewire the network and calculate the probability of the scenario observed in
the data. We shuffle named counterparties without changing the risk composition of each lender’s
portfolio. As a result, the properties that are usually used to measure risk concentration at the
lender level do not change. At each randomization, both the HHI and the number of counterparties
in the overlap remain the same, and only the link weights within risk categories are permuted. Our
metric DIsys of systemic interdependence, though, does change. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of
values of DIsys after N = 10
5 randomizations for the data sets DS1 and DS3. In both cases, the
probability of observing a value larger than the value of DIsys measured from the data is tiny (it is
0.36% for DS1 and < 0.01% for DS3). This shows that the portfolio overlap among lenders is highly
9
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Table 3: Properties of lenders of DS3. HHI and D are the risk-adjusted Herfindhal-Hirschman Index and
Dependency Index, respectively. Co-exposures and co-weights are the unadjusted and risk-adjusted
fraction of common exposures with respect to the lenders’ total exposure, respectively.
Lender HHI DI Co-exposures (%) Co-weights (%)
A 0.020 0.01046 73.34 75.91
B 0.038 0.04215 83.58 66.13
C 0.336 0.01036 38.22 44.56
D 0.062 0.48734 93.67 97.07
(a) DS1 (b) DS3
Figure 4: Distribution of values of DIsys after N = 10
5 randomizations of counterparty names within
each risk category. The vertical red bar corresponds to the value calculated from the data.
non-random, and skewed towards higher interdependence. The metric of systemic interdependence
DIsys allows us to give a quantitative estimation of this phenomenon.
5.4. Reaction of the system to increased credit risk
We now test the effect that increasing the risk of counterparties may have on the portfolios inter-
dependence in DS1. First, we imagine a scenario where one of the two low risk (risk category 1)
counterparties in the portfolio overlap is downgraded. Table 4 shows that a downgrade of either
counterparty (ID 3 and 9) generates an increase of both DIA and DIB . We can study the con-
vexity of the Dependency Index by downgrading both counterparties. Table 4 also shows that the
simultaneous downgrading of counterparties 3 and 9 generates an increase in DIA and DIB that
is about 3.5% higher than the sum of the effect of the two separate downgradings. This shows the
effect of the network in amplifying interdependence and systemic risk.
5.5. Sensitivity of the system to an increase in overlapping borrowers
We assess the effect of overlap increase by rewiring isolated exposures into common exposures in
DS1. At each iteration, we randomly choose two non-overlapping borrowers, in the same risk class,
and merge them, so that they become a common exposure. As in the previous simulations, this
rewiring does not change the properties of each portfolio at the bank level, such as the HHI, the
risk composition and the total exposure. Fig. 5 shows the effect of overlap increase as measured by
DIsys. The small non-monotonic jumps are due to the finite number of trials. In fact, it is possible
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Table 4: Increase of interdependence due to an increase of counterparty risk in DS1. ∆DIA and ∆DIB
represent the difference in the Dependency Index before and after a downgrading of counterparties
in the portfolio overlap.
ID ∆DIA ∆DIB
3 4.7 · 10−5 5.4 · 10−5
9 1.9 · 10−5 2.2 · 10−5
Both 6.8 · 10−5 7.9 · 10−5
Difference 2.4 · 10−6 2.7 · 10−6
Difference (%) 3.5% 3.5%
to show that the range of DIsys increases quite rapidly with the increase of overlap.
Figure 5: Evolution of 〈DIsys〉 after increasing the number of overlapping borrowers. The mean is calcu-
lated over N = 1000 iterations.
5.6. Sensitivity of the system to an increase of borrowers’ risk
A way to characterize the systemic importance of single borrowers is to assess the effect that an
increase in their risk may have on global metrics. In order to do that, for each borrower we
calculate the difference in DIsys and HHIsys after having increased by a factor 5 all the exposures
corresponding to the considered borrower. In this way, we estimate the effect that an increase in
its risk has on the concentration parameters of the system. The choice of the factor 5 mimics a
typical risk weight prescription of giving 20% of EAD to top tier counterparties and 100% to other
counterparties.
Figure 6 shows the result of this test in DS3. We plot the set of points with ∆DIsys > 0,
corresponding to the borrowers in the overlap. From this scatterplot it transpires that a narrow
11
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(a) DS3, year 1 (b) DS3, year 2
Figure 6: Sensitivity of the system to an increase in borrowers risk in DS3. Each point represents a
borrower whose risk has been increased by multiplying their adjacent exposures by a factor 5.
interval in ∆HHIsys may correspond to a quite diverse behavior in terms of ∆DIsys. This is
another sign of the extra information brought in by the new metric. Besides, the different values of
∆DIsys provide information on which borrowers are more systemically important whenever their
risk should increase. We will use this information to calculate the common exposure add-on in
Section 6.
We have also compared the systemic interdependence sensitivity ∆DIsys with well known net-
work centrality measures, to verify if the information captured by ∆DIsys were encapsulated in
more common network measures as in [8]. While eigenvector centrality appears to resemble the
behavior of ∆DIsys in one data set, we do not find any conclusive evidence that this holds across
all the data sets we consider.
6. Additional capital requirements of common exposures
The Internal Ratings Based (IRB) capital requirement and the Granularity Adjustment (GA) for-
mula provide an estimation of the capital needed by an institution to be functioning in the oc-
currence of economic downturns. In Appendix B we give a summary of the relevant formulae of
regulatory capital and Granularity adjustment that we are using in this paper. In this section,
we wish to calculate a third term, the further additional capital that is required to consider the
systemic risk due to common exposures.
6.1. Common exposure adjustment
Let us consider a lender with a portfolio of N borrowers in a system of lenders with overlapping
portfolios. In order to estimate the co-exposure capital add-on, we need a quantity that can give
us a measure of the relevance of each borrower in the common exposure risk. As we have seen
in Section 5, the increment in the Dependency Index under credit risk increase (∆DIi) measures
exactly that. In analogy with (29), we combine the PD and the Dependency Index and define the
12
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corresponding capital requirement as
XCE =
N∑
i=1
siX
i
CE , (12)
where si is the fraction of exposures of a given lender to borrower i (i.e.
∑
i si = 1) and
XiCE = MAi · LGDi
{
Φ
[
Φ−1(PDi) + η Φ−1
(
1 + θ(∆DIi)∆DIi
2
)]
− PDi
}
, (13)
where θ(x) is the step function; in other words, we only consider positive increments of Dependency
(∆DIi > 0). When a borrower i is not in the overlap, i.e. only linked to a single institution, its
contribution to XCE is zero (note that Φ
−1(0.5) = 0). This formula depends on the parameter
η, that governs the weight of the systemic co-exposure effect with respect to the other capital
requirements.
The measure in (12), however, needs to be calibrated to avoid that part of the risk encapsulated
in this term is already considered in the GA term.
6.2. Example of double counting
Let us consider the particular case represented in Figure 7a. (N − 1) lenders are exposed to N
borrowers; each lender has two counterparties; each exposure has the same weight v except the
two isolated exposures that have each weight equals to u. In order to compare the Dependency
Index and the Granularity Adjustment, we define a corresponding system where we aggregate all
the lenders into one and sum all the corresponding exposures. The result is shown in Figure 7b.
The common exposures become exposures of the aggregated lender and each has weight w = 2v,
whereas the two isolated exposures remain the same (u). As we assume normalized weights, we
have 2u + (N − 2)w = 1. Due to the homogeneity of common exposures in system (a), we can
calculate the GA in system (b) and study its behaviour in terms of the parameters u and w. By
construction, the parameter w = 2v corresponds to the overlap of portfolios in system (a), and the
parameter u corresponds to the non overlapping part.
A simple calculation of the Granularity Adjustment Γ of system (b) yields:
Γ = constant
[
1− 2(N − 2)w +N(N − 2)w2] . (14)
The behaviour of Equation (14) is represented in Figure 8. In this particular example, the behaviour
of Γ(w) corresponds to the behaviour of the GA as a function of the overlap in system (a). It is
easy to see that there are two regimes. When w > u, the GA encapsulates the effect of the overlap,
because an increase in the overlap and therefore the interdependence of system (a) (i.e. an increase
in w) corresponds to an increase in the concentration of the portfolio of lender B in system (b).
When w < u, the GA and the common exposures move in opposite directions, because an increase
in the overlap (i.e. an increase in w) corresponds to a more homogeneous portfolio for lender B. In
other words, we can infer that the condition of double counting is
∂Γ
∂(overlap)
> 0. (15)
6.3. Derivation of the capital adjustment
We use then this observation and equation (15) to estimate the double counting between the GA
and the Dependency Index. Let us distinguish whether the relative exposures si are in the overlap
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(a) Example of an uniformly co-exposed system of lenders.
(b) Corresponding system where all the lenders have been aggregated into a “super-
lender” B.
Figure 7: Example of a comparison between a simple system of overlapping portfolios (a) and a corre-
sponding aggregated system (b), with one “superlender” that has the same counterparties and
the same aggregated exposures (w = 2v).
(i.e. they are shared by at least two lenders) or not, by defining Ω the set of borrowers in the
overlap and Z the set of borrowers not in the overlap, and re-write the Granularity Adjustment
(32) as
Γ =
∑
i∈Ω s
2
i K˜i +
∑
i∈Z s
2
i K˜i∑
i∈Ω siKi +
∑
i∈Z siKi
, (16)
where Ki is the IRB approach capital corresponding to borrower i, and we define
K˜i =
1
2
Ci [(δ − 1)Ki +Ri] . (17)
Let us know define the weighted means of Ki over each subset Ω and Z as
〈K〉Ω =
∑
i∈Ω siKi∑
i∈Ω si
〈K〉Z =
∑
i∈Z siKi∑
i∈Z si
. (18)
Using these quantities, we can approximate the formula (16) as
Γ =
(∑
i∈Ω s
2
i
) 〈K˜〉Ω + (∑i∈Z s2i ) 〈K˜〉Z(∑
i∈Ω si
) 〈K〉Ω + (∑i∈Z si) 〈K〉Z . (19)
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w
Γ
w < u w > u
1
N
Figure 8: Graphical representation of Equation (14).
In order to study how the GA behaves with respect to overlap, we assume a small perturbation
 of the exposures fractions s: Γ(s′) = Γ(s + ). The perturbation slightly increases the overlap
and decreases the non-overlap by the same amount, more specifically{
s′i = si +  if i ∈ Ω
s′i = si − NΩNZ  if i ∈ Z
(20)
where  > 0, NΩ is the number of borrowers in the overlap and NZ = N − NΩ is the number
of borrowers outside the overlap. This perturbation increases overlap without changing the total
exposures of the considered lender (
∑
i si =
∑
i s
′
i = 1).
After imposing the conditions (20), the overlap in the GA is encapsulated by the scalar parameter
 and we can study how the GA increases with it:
dΓ
d
∣∣∣∣
=0
≥ 0. (21)
Equation (21) is satisfied if and only if
r =
NΩ
NZ
2〈K˜〉Z
∑
i∈Z si
(〈K〉Ω∑i∈Ω si + 〈K〉Z∑i∈Z si)+NZ〈K〉Ω (〈K˜〉Ω∑i∈Ω s2i + 〈K˜〉Z∑i∈Z s2i)
2〈K˜〉Ω
∑
i∈Z si
(〈K〉Ω∑i∈Ω si + 〈K〉Z∑i∈Z si)+NΩ〈K〉Z (〈K˜〉Ω∑i∈Ω s2i + 〈K˜〉Z∑i∈Z s2i) ≤ 1.
(22)
Equation (22) gives an estimate on the amount of double counting between the GA and our
co-exposure capital XCE , to correct the capital adjustment. We propose then a total capital
requirement that reads
Ktotal = K + Γ +KCE(α, η), (23)
where the Common Exposure Capital Adjustment KCE is
KCE(α, η) = [α(r − 1) + 1]XCE(η). (24)
The two parameters (α and η) govern the capital add-on due to common exposures. The term
[α(r − 1) + 1] in (24) is designed in such a way that when double counting occurs (r < 1), the
co-exposure capital requirement decreases linearly with r (and therefore KCE < XCE).
7. Parameter calibration and application to data
The calibration of parameters α and η is obtained by comparison with numerical simulations.
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7.1. Numerical simulations
We perform numerical simulations using as an input the PDs reported in DS3, the data set with
the largest overlap. For each lender, we calculate the distribution of losses by uniformly generating
random numbers for each borrower i and comparing it with their corresponding PDi. In the
present work we use 105 iterations. We then calculate the Value-at-Risk (VaR) at q = 0.999 and
the expected losses EL. The unexpected losses are simply the difference UL = V aR− EL.
We perform these simulations both with the reported data and in a simplified downturn scenario.
The downturn scenario is encapsulated by a new set of probabilities of default PDS that we define
as
PDSi =
√
A · PDi, (25)
where A = 0.3. We adopt this definition to mimic the effect of a downturn to probabilities of
default.
7.2. Parameter calibration
In order to calibrate the parameters α and η, we choose a data set and compare the results of
the numerical simulations in the downturn scenario with the analytical capital requirements result-
ing from the sum of the capital calculated in the IRB infinitely granular approach (28) plus the
Granularity Adjustment (32). The difference between the analytically calculated capital and the
estimation from the numerical simulations constitutes a gap that we use to calibrate the parameters,
by setting this gap equal to the common exposure adjustment KCE .
This method is not driven by the quite strong assumption that the gap can be entirely explained
by the systemic effect of common exposures. Rather, it aims to use the gap as a guide towards a
typical scale to which it seems sensible to measure a further capital requirement. In real terms,
the systemic effect of common exposures may be larger than what can be captured by Monte Carlo
simulations that, differently from the dependency index and analogous network measures, focus on
one portfolio at the time.
Table 5 calculates this gap using Data Set 3 (year 1).
Table 5: Calculation of the difference (gap) between the unexpected losses (UL) calculated by Monte Carlo
simulations in the adverse scenario described in the text and the analytical calculation of regulatory
capital (K) plus granularity adjustment (Γ), using Data Set 3 (year 1).
Lender UL (numeric) K + Γ Gap
A 0.043 0.036 0.007
B 0.051 0.043 0.008
C 0.232 0.372 -0.139
D 0.074 0.065 0.009
With the exception of lender C, the analytically calculated capital requirement (K+Γ) is smaller
than the unexpected losses simulated numerically. In the case of lender C, the level of risk of the
portfolio appears instead to be completely captured by K + Γ. Therefore, in the case of lender C
we set KCE = 0. For the other three lenders, instead, we set the gap equal to the co-exposure
capital KCE in (24) and use the method of the least squares to fit the parameters. We obtain:
α = 0.53; η = 68.9. (26)
Using the parameters in (26) we can then calculate KCE for the other year of DS3. Table 6 shows
the results of this calculation as well as a comparison with the numerical calculation. As we can
see, after calibration with a different data set, the capital add-on KCE is able to capture quite well
the amount of difference between K + Γ and the simulated UL.
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Table 6: Calculation of the common exposure capital addition KCE for the system reported in DS3 (year
2).
Lender UL (numeric) K + Γ KCE
A 0.0732 0.0607 0.0136
B 0.0392 0.0339 0.0039
C 0.1312 0.1741 0.0000
D 0.0714 0.0647 0.0045
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new measure of credit concentration risk (Dependency Index) that
encapsulates the systemic effect of interconnectedness due to common exposures. We apply this
metric on several data sets to illustrate its properties, and we use the metric to calculate analytically
the additional capital that quantifies the systemic effect of common exposures risk. The capital
add-on can be calibrated to avoid double counting between the granularity adjustment and the
co-exposure adjustment.
Broadly speaking, our approach is to measure credit concentration risk at the system level,
rather than separately looking at each financial institution portfolios individually. We show that
this metric is able to summarize the degree of interdependence in a network of exposures.
The value of the Dependency Index is essentially affected by the network topology and the
riskiness of exposures. By testing this metric on a number of data sets, even in the case of low
overlap among portfolios, we show that the metric is able to describe the effect of credit risk increase
and capture non-linear effects due to the interplay of exposure connectivity. The interdependence
analysis also provides insights into the properties of the overlap itself. In particular, we show
that the portfolio overlap between two institutions may be highly non-random, and skewed towards
higher interdependence. This may be due to a number of reasons: tendency of high risk borrowers to
be indebted to multiple institutions, lower credit rating of larger borrowers, etc. Investigating these
causal relationships is beyond the scope of the present work, but the Dependency Index allows us
to give a quantitative estimation of this phenomenon. We also explore the effect of overlap increase
and find that the metric behaves as expected. By comparing the sensitivity of DI and HHI to
an increase of borrowers’ risk, we show that the Dependency Index provides extra information on
which borrowers are systemically important.
Although approximated, our co-exposure adjustment is able to capture, with only two parame-
ters, an aspect of systemic risk that, to our knowledge, has been neglected so far and the complexity
in the interplay among (risk-adjusted) exposures. This is an essential step in developing a more
comprehensive methodology to supervise and manage credit risk in a complex system of financial
institutions.
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A. Properties of the Dependency Index
Metrics of inequality are often tested against a number of properties [7, 16, 17]. Therefore, here
we analyse some properties of the Dependency Index DI to check its validity as a measure of
co-exposure risk.
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Figure 9: Building block of a bipartite network of common exposures.
A.1. Minimum Dependency
Dependency DIi of lender i is zero if and only if when lender i has no co-exposures.
We can define this concept more formally as
DIi = 0 ⇔ sji = 0 for each j 6= i. (27)
This is immediately evident from the definition (4).
A.2. Transfer to co-exposures
If a lender transfers a fraction of an exposure from an isolated borrower to a co-exposed borrower,
by an amount that is small compared with the exposure size, the dependency of that lender increases.
We can see this by focusing on a bipartite network with two lenders (A and B), three borrowers
(1,2,3) and the following matrix of exposures:
W =
 wA1 0wA2 wB2
0 wB3
 .
This is the building block of a bipartite network of common exposures (Fig. 9).
If we transfer a quantity  > 0 from the isolated exposure 1 to the common exposure 2 as in{
w′A1 = wA1 − 
w′A2 = wA2 + 
,
we can study the effect on the dependency indexes as a function of . A direct calculation shows
that ∂Di()/∂ ≥ 0 for i = A,B, so does DIsys by definition.
A.3. Merging of common exposures (superadditivity)
If two common exposures merge, the dependency metric of the involved lenders increases.
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(a) Before the merge (b) After the merge
Figure 10: Merging of two common exposures. Borrowers 1 and 2 merge and become borrower 3, with
wA3 = wA1 + wA2, wB3 = wB1 + wB2.
Let us consider the simplified case of a network with two lenders and two common exposures
(Fig. 10a), described by the weight matrix:
W =
(
wA1 wB1
wA2 wB2
)
.
We wish to study the difference in the dependency metrics with the corresponding network char-
acterized by a merging of the two borowers, i.e.
W ′ =
(
wA3 wB3
)
,
where wA3 = wA1 + wA2, wB3 = wB1 + wB2 (Fig. 10b).
A direct calculation shows that we have always D′A ≥ DA and D′B ≥ DB . In particular, we have
D′A = DA and D
′
B = DB if and only if wA1/wA2 = wB1/wB2, i.e. the merging of two common
exposures typically increases the systemic interdependence. The exception is a particular case when
the relative exposure of the two lenders to the two borrowers is exactly the same.
A.4. Effect of isolated exposures
If a lender transfers a fraction of an exposure to a new counterparty that has not borrowed from
other lenders, by an amount that is small compared with the exposure size, the Dependency Index
of the system decreases.
To see that, we can use the same setting as in Section A.2, where wA1 = 0 and we consider the
transfer {
w′A1 = 
w′A2 = wA2 −  ,
where  > 0. A direct calculation shows that D′A ≤ DA, D′B ≤ DB , and therefore D′sys ≤ DIsys by
definition.
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B. IRB approach and Granularity Adjustment
Let us summarize here the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach and the formula of Granular-
ity Adjustment that we use in the paper. Our starting point is recalling the formula of capital
calculation according to the IRB approach Basel methodology [4]:
K =
N∑
i=1
siKi, (28)
where the sum runs over all the exposures of the considered lender, si is the fraction of exposure
to borrower i, and Ki is defined as
Ki = MAi
{
LGDi · Φ
[
Φ−1(PDi) +
√
ρiΦ
−1(q)√
1− ρi
]
− LGDi · PDi
}
, (29)
where Φ(x) is the cumulative normal distribution and Φ−1(x) its inverse, q is the qth chosen per-
centile of the (normally distributed) systematic risk factor, ρi is the correlation between the returns
of borrower i and the systematic risk factor, and MAi is the maturity adjustment, that is estimated
as
MAi =
1 + (M − 2.5)b(PDi)
1− 1.5b(PDi) , (30)
where
b(PD) = [0.119− 0.0548 log(PD)] . (31)
Typically, one sets q = 0.999.
As it is well-known, the Basel formula (28) is written for a portfolio that is infinitely granular. It
is then necessary to add a Granularity Adjustment (GA). Here we use the Granularity Adjustment
proposed by [11]:
Γ =
1
2K
N∑
i=1
s2iCi [δ(Ki +Ri)−Ki] , (32)
where Ri is the loan-loss reserve
Ri = E[LGDi] · PDi, (33)
δ is a regulatory parameter that is calibrated as δ = 4.83 and Ci is defined as
Ci =
γE[LGDi](1− E[LGDi]) + E[LGDi]2
E[LGDi]
, (34)
where γ = 0.25 [11].
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